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We analyze the impact of (exogenous) tax morale on the optimal design of progressive 
income taxation. In our model, only universal basic income (transfer) is financed from a 
linear income tax and the financing of public goods is neglected. Each individual supplies 
labor and (un)declares earning, depending on his labor disutility and tax morale, 
respectively. Limiting the utilitarianism to the poorer parts of the population (defined by 
the welfare share), the optimal tax rate is an increasing function of the tax morale and a 
decreasing function of the welfare share. 
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Jobb adómorál – nagyobb optimális adókulcs 
 






Hogyan hat az exogén adómorál a progresszív jövedelemadó optimális kulcsára?   
Ezt elemezzük egy olyan modellben, amelyben a lineáris jövedelemadó csak univerzális 
alapjövedelmet finanszíroz, és a közjavak pénzügyi fedezetét elhanyagoljuk. Minden egyén 
munkaáldozatától és adómoráljától függően vállal munkát, illetve titkolja el keresete egy 
részét. Általánosított Rawls-féle társadalmi jóléti függvény esetén igazoljuk, hogy a 
társadalmi jólétet maximalizáló egykulcsos adó mértéke az adómorál növekvő függvénye. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak:  adómorál, progresszív személyi jövedelemadó, eltitkolt kereset, 
munkakínálat, jövedelemújraelosztás 
 





  4 1. Introduction
Between 1930 and 1970 the ratio of government tax and social security revenues to
the GDP had risen sharply and has remained at a high level since 1970s in the devel-
oped world. It is a commonplace that rising wage-income (and other) tax rates may
diminish labor supply and increase tax evasion. But comparing di®erent countries, it
becomes evident that the impact of taxation on economic activity also depends on the
so-called \tax morale" (or morality). This concept refers to the propensity to pay taxes
or capturing \the readiness with which individuals leave the o±cial economy and enter
the illegitimate (untaxed) hidden economy" (Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984); see
also Lago{Penas and Lago{Penas (2010) for its determinants). We should distinguish
between exogenous and endogenous individual tax morales: the former is a given para-
meter of the utility function, the latter depends on the exogenous tax morale as well as
on the observed behavior of the individual's neighborhood.
In the present paper, I try to analyze the impact of the exogenous tax morale on
the socially optimal tax rate in a very simple static model, where a °at-rate income tax
¯nances a universal basic income (transfer), neglecting the ¯scal demand of providing
public goods. In this model, the existence of tax morale makes monitoring and pun-
ishing tax evasion super°uous. Another factor determining the optimal tax rate is the
progressivity of the social welfare function, meaning how much it favors redistribution.
(With the usual CRRA social welfare function, the lower the power index, the more
progressive it is.) Then the optimal °at tax rate is an increasing function of the tax
morale and of the progressivity of the social welfare function.
If one works with traditional, strictly concave utility functions (from Mirrlees (1971)
to Simonovits (2010)), then in this type of models, the calculations soon become exces-
sively complex, requiring numerical illustrations. However, in a recent paper, Doerren-
berg et al. (2011) introduced a very simple linear{quadratic utility function, where the
optimal labor supply and undeclared earning are simple linear functions, namely the
former is proportional to the net of tax rate and the latter is equal to the ratio of the
wage rate to the tax morale.
Adopting this trick, the present paper works with a model which is more amenable
to analytical investigation than my previous model was. To make sense of income re-
distribution, however, the purely utilitarian social welfare function used there had to be
replaced by a generalized utilitarian social welfare function. We de¯ne a truncated (or
generalized Rawlsian) social welfare function as the average of the ¯rst J lowest utilities
out of I utilities, J < I, J being the cuto® index, and º = J=I being the welfare share.
1For truncated or exclusive social welfare functions (cf. Ravaillon, 1997), I was able to
determine explicitly the socially optimal tax rate and show that it is an increasing func-
tion of the tax morale and a decreasing function of the welfare share (Theorems 1 and
2). In the simplest speci¯cation (when only the poorest's utility is considered: Ralwsian
case), the optimal tax rate is given by ¿[¹] = 1=2 ¡ 1=(2¹), where ¿ denotes the tax
rate and ¹ denotes the tax morale. I also investigated numerically this dependence for
inclusive social welfare functions, and I invariably received qualitatively this schedule,
similarly to Ravaillon (1997, p. 359)'s observation: \the theoretical distinction [between
exclusive and inclusive social welfare functions] can sometimes be of very little practical
consequence". I hope that the results remain valid in more general settings (cf. Si-
monovits (2010) with strictly concave utility functions and public expenditures). Note
that the arti¯cial speci¯cation of the utility functions and the exclusion of consumption-
and social security taxes preclude any empirical veri¯cation. The present toy model is
only able to illustrate certain causal relations.
In this framework, the intuition behind the major result is relatively simple. The
government's objective is to maximize the social welfare function. Raising the tax rate
increases the transfer share but diminishes the labor supply and thus the total output.
For any given tax rate, the higher the tax morale, the lower is the undeclared earning,
making room for more redistribution via raising the tax rate. But we need a model to
make this intuitive argument watertight.
To relate the foregoing highly theoretical observation to the real world, I present a
very stylized table, describing various combinations of tax morales (lower and higher)
and tax shares (low, medium, high) de¯ned as the ratio of tax (and pension) revenues to
the GDP. These somewhat unreliable but still characteristic numbers refer to the pre-
crisis era and contain many things directly not related to our problem (budget de¯cits,
interest payments, di®erent public pension systems etc). I tentatively interpret Table 1
as showing that a medium tax share may be socially optimal for a country with lower
tax morale (e.g. the Czech Republic versus Slovakia or Hungary), while a high tax
share may be optimal for a country with higher tax morale (like Sweden versus Japan
or Germany).
Table 1. Tax shares, tax morales and ranking of social welfare
Tax share Low Medium High
cc. 30% cc. 40% cc. 50%
Lower morale Slovakia < Czech Rep. > Hungary
Higher morale Japan < Germany < Sweden
At this stage, I make a short review of the literature. In his pioneering paper,
Mirrlees (1971) solved the theoretical problem of the socially optimal income taxation,
when labor supply is °exible but productivity is private knowledge. Sheshinski (1972)
simpli¯ed the analysis by con¯ning his attention to linear taxes (cf. Feldstein, 1973).
One limitation of these papers is that they did not consider tax evasion. Taking the
opposite extreme position, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) analyzed income tax evasion,
neglecting the °exibility of labor supply. In a sequel to that paper, Sandmo (1981)
2extended the research on tax evasion into the direction of social welfare maximization
with °exible labor supply and raised a weaker form of the conjecture of the present
paper (p. 279): \a natural question to ask is whether ... the marginal tax rate in
some sense ought to be lower than otherwise have been because of the presence of tax
evasion." Later on (p. 282) he gave alternative su±cient conditions, namely either
\regular income is now a less reliable indicator of economic welfare" or \the numerical
value of the compensated supply derivative in the regular market is increased" but did
not commit himself to their validity.
From Feldstein (1999) to Chetty (2009) and Saez et al. (2009), a great number of
papers studied tax avoidance and the deadweight loss of the income tax, putting the
concept of elasticity of taxable income to the center of the analysis.
In their survey, Andreoni et al. (1998) extended the narrow neoclassical model and
introduced soft but relevant concepts like moral sentiments and the satisfaction of the
taxpayer with the provision of public goods and services. From our point of view, they
made three important observations: (i) the morally more sensitive citizens declare a
higher share of their true (pre-tax) incomes; (ii) the more unfair the tax-and-transfer
system is in the eyes of citizens, the less income they declare; (iii) the less satis¯ed
the taxpayers are with the provision of public goods and services, the less income they
declare.
Traxler (2010) extended the analysis from exogenous to endogenous tax morales,
where the individual tax morale depends on the observed degree of tax evasion. Com-
bining the two approaches, Garay et al. (2011) and M¶ eder et al. (2011) investigated
the dynamics of the tax evasion process. Using the framework of Simonovits (2010),
both papers neglected income redistribution and studied the dynamics of the declared
(or taxable) incomes ¯nancing the provision of public goods.
In the paper already mentioned, Doerrenberg et al. (2011) considered di®erentiated
taxation among di®erent groups in di®erent countries. Using econometric techniques,
they found that typically in any country, \nice guys ¯nish last: people with higher tax
morale are taxed more heavily". Making the individual utilities dependent on others'
utilities, Doerrenberg and Peichl (2010) discussed the opposite causality and found that
greater tax progressivity implies higher tax morale.
Romer (1975) also obtained interesting results concerning the majority voting on lin-
ear income taxes|an alternative to welfare analysis. In such a political economy frame-
work, Meltzer and Richard (1981) proved an interesting intuitive result: the greater the
pre-tax income inequality, the greater redistribution will be chosen by the median voter.
(By the way, Theorem 1* of the present paper reproduces this result, also preserving
the in°uence of tax morale.)
Alesina and Angelitos (2005), however, found an apparent anomaly: compare two
countries, say the US and Sweden. Though the US inequality of the pre-tax incomes
is greater than the Swedish, the US personal income tax is less progressive than the
Swedish. They created a model with country-speci¯c beliefs on the role of luck in the
determination of individual pre-tax earnings. Their major result was as follows: the
stronger the presumed role of luck, the greater income redistribution is selected. In
contrast, in our social welfare maximization framework, this anomaly can be explained
by the di®erence between the countries' social welfare functions: the impact of the
lower welfare share overrules the impact of the lower pre-tax income inequality, implying
3higher optimal tax rate.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the
model and Section 3 displays the illustrations. Section 4 concludes.
2. The model
Following Doerrenberg et al. (2011), we shall use a very simple model. There are I > 1
types in the population, indexed as i = 1;:::;n. Type i's labor supply is li, 0 < li · 1,
his pre-tax wage rate (independently of the tax system) is wi > 0, both reals, thus
his earning is liwi. To achieve income redistribution, the government operates a linear
tax with a °at (marginal) tax rate ¿, 0 · ¿ · 1 and a basic income ¯ ¸ 0. Type i
undeclares ei ¸ 0 from his earning, i.e. he evades tax ¿ei, therefore his net tax is equal
to ¿(liwi ¡ ei) ¡ ¯ = ¿yi ¡ ¯, where yi = liwi ¡ ei denotes the declared (or taxable)
earning. Consequently, his consumption is given by ci = (1¡¿)liwi+¿ei+¯. Note that
for any positive basic income ¯ > 0, even the °at-rate tax is progressive in the sense
that the average net tax rate ti = (¿yi ¡ ¯)=yi is increasing in the declared earning yi.
To derive the dual choice of labor supply and undeclared earning from individual
utility maximization, we must assume an individual objective function. To obtain ex-
plicit formulas, we rely on a linear{quadratic utility function. In addition to a usual
linear consumption utility 2ci and a quadratic labor disutility function ¡®wil2
i, (® > 0
being the coe±cient of labor disutility), we introduce a quadratic moral disutility func-
tion of tax evasion ¡¹(¿wi)¡1(¿ei)2, (¹ > 0 being the coe±cient of tax morale, for
short, the tax morale). (We shall see that the factors wi and (¿wi)¡1 make the optimal
labor supply independent of and the optimal undeclared earning proportional to the
type-speci¯c wage rate, respectively. Note that we imitate Yitzaki (1974), who made
the penalty to be proportional to the evaded tax rather than the undeclared earning.
Finally, by doubling the consumption in the utility function, the fraction 1=2 is avoided
in further formulas.) In sum, type i's utility function is





Inserting formula for ci into formula for Ui, we receive a reduced utility function





Of course, the value of the basic income ¯ depends on the decisions of every worker
(see below). Since the impact of any single worker on ¯ can be neglected, our workers
neglect it. Therefore type i maximizes the curtailed utility function ui(li;ei) ¡ 2¯.
Taking the partial derivatives of this concave function with respect to li and ei and
equating them to zero, his optimal decisions are respectively
l¤
i = ®¡1(1 ¡ ¿) and e¤
i = ¹¡1wi:
Note the simple meaning of these rules: the optimal labor supply l¤
i is proportional to
1 minus the tax rate (the so-called net of tax rate) 1 ¡ ¿, where the proportionality
coe±cient is the reciprocal of ®; the optimal undeclared earning e¤
i is proportional to
4the wage rate wi, where the proportionality coe±cient is the reciprocal of ¹. In a white
economy (studied by Mirrlees), ¹ = 1 and e¤
i = 0. Unfortunately, our optimal unde-
clared earning e¤
i is unrelated to the true earning l¤
iwi or the tax rate ¿. Furthermore,
a more complicated suitable utility function would imply a more general and realistic
labor supply{tax rate function l¤
i = ®¡1¡°i¿ with ®¡1 > °i but we forsake this option.
To obtain feasible labor supply for any tax rate, it is appropriate to assume ® ¸ 1,
in the limit: ® = 1. It is also logical to assume that at the optimum, the undeclared
earning is less than or equal to the true earning, i.e. ¹¡1 · ®¡1(1¡¿), i.e. ¿ · 1¡®=¹,
implying ® · ¹. We can make the following observation: the higher the tax morale ¹,
the higher is the upper limit 1 ¡ ®=¹ on the feasible tax rate!
Turning from individual to aggregate behavior, we assume that the weight of type


























At the optimum, they are equal to L¤ = (1 ¡ ¿)®¡1 = Y ¤ and E¤ = ¹¡1, respectively.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the total (or average) net tax is zero
(neglecting the provision of public goods), i.e. we end up with the following budget
constraint taken at the optimum:
¯¤ = ¿(Y ¤ ¡ E¤) = ¿[®¡1(1 ¡ ¿) ¡ ¹¡1]:
To ¯nd the socially optimal tax rate and the corresponding basic income, it is worth
expressing the optimal reduced utilities as indirect utility functions:
u¤
i = wi[®¡1(1 ¡ ¿)2 + ¹¡1¿] + ¿[®¡1(1 ¡ ¿) ¡ ¹¡1]:
Moving to social welfare maximization, note that contrary to Simonovits (2010), we
cannot use a purely utilitarian social welfare function, because the individual utility is
a linear function of the individual consumption|making any income redistribution not
only useless but counterproductive. Rather we look for a family of generalized social
welfare function which keep the simplicity of the purely utilitarian one but does not
exclude redistribution. We shall introduce truncated utilitarian (or generalized Rawlsian
or exclusive) social welfare functions, de¯ned as the average of the J lowest utilities,
J being the cuto® index. (Later on we shall work with the relative index º = J=I,
to be called welfare share.) Note that in the present model, these indirect utilities are
increasing linear functions of the wage rates. If we index the latter as w1 < w2 < ¢¢¢ <
wI¡1 < wI, then u¤
1 < u¤
2 < ¢¢¢ < w¤
I¡1 < w¤
I. Hence the de¯nition of the truncated







i; J = 1;2;:::;I:
5The higher the cuto® index J, the more indi®erent is the social planner to the utility
di®erences. We display the two limit cases.











Note that the social welfare functions V1;:::;VI¡1 fail to depend on all the utilities
but they are simple and approximate well the much more complex CRRA social welfare
functions, therefore we rely on them.
Before announcing our main theorem, as a counterpart to VJ, we shall de¯ne the






wi: j = 1; 2; :::; I:
Because wis are increasing, so do WJs: w1 = W1 < W2 < ¢¢¢ < WI¡1 < WI = W = 1.
Here is our major result.
Theorem 1. Let us choose a cuto® index J < I and assume that the J-minimum
average wage rate is lower than the critical value:




Then for the J-truncated social welfare function, the J-optimal tax rate is positive and
is given by
¿J(®;¹) =
2(1 ¡ ®=¹) ¡ (2 ¡ ®=¹)WJ
2(2 ¡ WJ)
:
Remarks. 1. For a ¯xed cuto® index J and for any su±ciently low ¯xed labor
disutility coe±cient ® ¸ 1, the tax rate{tax morale function ¿J[¹] is increasing in the








2. The special Rawlsian optimal tax rate is given by
¿1(®;¹) =
2(1 ¡ ®=¹) ¡ (2 ¡ ®=¹)w1
2(2 ¡ wJ)
> 0 if w1 < ¹ w:
If there are workers with zero wage rates: w1 = 0, then the Rawlsian tax rate is
¿1 = (1 ¡ ®=¹)=2.
3. The literature has concentrated on the dependence of the tax rate on the labor
disutility, to be denoted here by ¿Jf®g. Of course, this function is decreasing in labor
disutility coe±cient ® until reaching zero.
4. Note that in our model, for every cuto® index J, the optimal tax rate only
depends on the ratio of the tax morale to the labor disutility parameter, ®=¹ rather
than on ® and ¹. Probably, this is only an implication of our speci¯cation of the utility
functions.
6Proof. The J-truncated social welfare function is the average of the J lowest
indirect utility functions and each of them is a linear function of the corresponding
wage rate, i.e.
VJ(¿) = WJ[®¡1(1 ¡ ¿)2 + ¹¡1¿] + 2¿[®¡1(1 ¡ ¿) ¡ ¹¡1]:
Taking the derivative of VJ(¿) and equating it with zero, yields ¿J(®;¹). Since V 0
J(¿)
turns from positive into negative at the stationary point, it is a local (and global)
maximum. WJ < ¹ w is equivalent to ¿J(®;¹) > 0. The qualitative behavior of ¿J[¹] is
obvious.
If we give up the uniformity of the tax morales and the labor disutilities, then the
ordering of the indirect utilities becomes cumbersome.
We turn now to the dependence of the optimal tax rate on the cuto® index J,
measuring the extent of exclusion of the richer groups. Intuitively, we expect that the
lower the cuto® index, the higher is the optimal tax rate. Indeed, this is the case.
Theorem 2. Let w1 < ¹ w and let K be an integer such that WK < ¹ w · WK+1.
Then the socially optimal positive tax rates are decreasing in the cuto® index J: ¿1 >
¿2 > ¢¢¢ > ¿K > ¿K+1 = ¢¢¢ = ¿I = 0.
Proof. Since w1 < ¹ w < 1 = W, there exists a K appearing in Theorem 2. By
Theorem 1, ¿J is an decreasing function of WJ, which in turn is increasing in J.
As is usual in welfare economics, for any J, it is worth calculating the degree of the
suboptimality of the presumed tax morale-speci¯c optimum ¿J[^ ¹] in an economy with a
tax morale ¹: ^ ¹ 6= ¹. Fixing the ratios of pre-tax wage rates, we look for that average
wage rate ~ W, for which ¿J[¹; ^ ¹] yields the same welfare as the original unit average
wage rate and ¿J[¹] do.
To simplify the formulas, we only consider a very simple case.
Theorem 3. Assume that ® = 1 and the poorest workers' wage rate is zero: w1 = 0.
Then the degree of suboptimality of applying a Rawlsian tax rate ¿1[^ ¹] in an economy
with true tax morale ¹ is
~ W(¹; ^ ¹) =
(1 ¡ ¹¡1)2
(1 ¡ ^ ¹¡1)(1 + ^ ¹¡1 ¡ 2¹¡1)
¸ 1:
Remark. The most important case is when the government presumes a white
economy with ^ ¹ = 1. Then the welfare loss is equal to
~ W(¹;1) ¡ 1 =
¹¡2
1 ¡ 2¹¡1 for ¹ > 2:
Proof. For w1 = 0, the perceived utility function is u¤
1(¹; ^ ¹;¿) = 2¿1(1¡¿ ¡ ^ ¹¡1).
Hence ¿1[^ ¹] = (1 ¡ ^ ¹¡1)=2. Substituting it into u¤
1 yields
u¤
1[¹; ^ ¹] = u¤
1(¹; ^ ¹;¿1[^ ¹]) = (1 ¡ ^ ¹¡1)[(1=2)(1 + ^ ¹¡1) ¡ ¹¡1]:
At correct estimation, u¤
1[¹;¹] = (1¡¹¡1)2=2. Using the de¯nition ~ Wu¤
1[¹; ^ ¹] = u¤
1[¹;¹],
yields the result.
At this point we make a short detour into the realm of political economy. Assuming
that I = 2M¡1, denote the median wage rate by wM. Then the median worker's indirect
utility satis¯es the single-peaked condition and the optimal tax rate corresponds to that
of Theorem 1, only the J-minimal wage rate is replaced by the median one.
7Theorem 1.* Assume that the median wage rate is less than the critical value (of
Theorem 1):




Then the median voter's preferred tax rate is positive and is given by
¿¤(®;¹) =
2(1 ¡ ®=¹) ¡ (2 ¡ ®=¹)wM
2(2 ¡ wM)
:
Remarks. 1. In accordance with Meltzer and Richard (1981), in our model the
greater the pre-tax earning inequality, here measured by the di®erence between the
average and the median wage rates 1¡wM, the greater redistribution will be chosen by
the median voter.
2. Since the M-minimal average wage rate is generally lower than the median wage
rate: WM < wM, therefore 0 < ¿¤(®;¹) < ¿M(®;¹), i.e. the M-optimum tax rate
is higher than the median voter's. Also, the same upper bound on WM and on wM
means much stronger restriction in the political economy model than in the welfare
maximization model.
3. Numerical illustrations
To give a feeling of the magnitudes and display the di®erence between our truncated and
the usual CRRA social welfare functions, we rely on numerical illustrations. We shall
work with the following extremely simple speci¯cations. We shall use a stylized version
of US income distribution with quintiles (I = 5), taken as a wage rate distribution, and
normalized its expected value to 1 (see the ¯rst column of Table 2 below). We work
with the minimal labor disutility parameter, namely ® = 1.
To make our presentation less dependent on the number of types, we shall work
with the relative share of preferred workers in the population to be called welfare share:
º = J=I rather than their absolute numbers or the cuto® index J. We start the
illustrations with index J = 2 or rather with welfare share º = 0:4. First we display a
simple run with tax morale ¹ = 4, i.e. workers undeclare 1/4 of their wage rates (or their
potential earnings), regardless of their earnings, implying the numerically determined
optimal tax rate, being equal to 0.287. (Note that due to less than maximal labor
supply, the ratio of undeclared earning to actual earning is higher than 1/4.) Table
2 produces sensible results and presumably can be used for further calculations. The




i) ¡ ¯¤, the poorest quintile receives about half its potential
earnings and the richest quintile pays about 8% of its potential earnings.
8Table 2. The individual optimal outcomes for 2-quintile optimum
Wage Undeclared Transfer





0.2 0.050 {0.106 0.249
0.4 0.100 {0.080 0.365
0.7 0.175 {0.040 0.539
1.1 0.275 0.013 0.771
2.6 0.650 0.213 1.642
Remarks. º = 0:4, ¹ = 4, ¿0:4 = 0:287, L¤ = 0:713. We use notation ¿º rather than
¿º, to distinguish the utilitarian optimum ¿1 from the Rawlsian optimum ¿1.
As a detour, we present the political economy equilibrium. Distinguishing the third
quintile from the three lowest quintiles, we shall use subindex [0.5] rather than 0.6.
The political economy equilibrium is much lower than the 2-quintile optimum: ¿[0:5] =
0:106 < 0:237 = ¿0:6 (see Table 5 below). Correspondingly, the redistribution is also
lower, but the labor supply is higher: L¤ = 0:894.
Table 3. The individual optimal outcomes in political economy
Wage Undeclared Transfer





0.2 0.050 {0.055 0.233
0.4 0.100 {0.041 0.399
0.7 0.175 {0.020 0.646
1.1 0.275 0.007 0.977
2.6 0.650 0.109 2.216
Remark. ¹ = 4, ¿[0:5] = 0:106 and L¤ = 0:894.
Next we move to studying the impact of tax morale on optimal average outcomes,
and usually drop the adjective average. In Table 4, the tax morale runs from 2 to 12
to in¯nity (white economy) and see the quantitative side of Theorem 1: the optimal
tax rate rises from 0.162 to 0.370 to 0.407. Note that even in the white economy, there
remains a huge discrepancy between the highest and the lowest consumption; their ratio
drops from 9.9 to 3.8, but not to 1.
9Table 4. The impact of tax morale on optimal outcomes for 2-quintiles
Tax Lowest Lowest Consumption
morale rate consumption ratio
¹ ¿0:4[¹] c1 c5=c1
2 0.162 0.211 9.9
4 0.287 0.249 6.6
6 0.328 0.267 5.5
8 0.349 0.277 5.0
10 0.362 0.283 4.8
12 0.370 0.288 4.6
::: :::
1 0.407 0.308 3.8
Remark. º = 0:4.
Next, we illustrate the impact of the welfare share º on the social optimum. We
return to the tax morale of Table 2, ¹ = 4. In harmony with our Theorem 2, as the
welfare share drops from 1 (pure utilitarianism) to 0.2 (Rawls), the optimal tax rate
rises from 0 to 0.319. However, the labor supply falls correspondingly. As a result, the
absolute value of the lowest quintile's consumption hardly rises after leaving out the
richest quintile from the social welfare function, only the ratio of the highest quintile's
consumption to the lowest's, c5=c1 drops from 13 to 6.3 but does not approach 1.
Table 5. The impact of welfare share on optimal outcomes
Welfare Tax Lowest Consumption
share rate consumption ratio
º ¿º[¹] c1 c5=c1
1.0 0.000 0.200 13.0
0.8 0.161 0.244 8.3
0.6 0.237 0.250 7.2
0.4 0.287 0.249 6.6
0.2 0.319 0.246 6.3
Remark. ¹ = 4.
To study the sensitivity of the result to the speci¯cation of the social welfare function,
for a while, we replace our truncated version with the more accepted CRRA social







To determine the socially optimal tax rate, now we must rely on numerical calculations.
Table 6 shows a similar picture as Table 5. Here are the results.
10Table 6. The impact of the indi®erence index on optimal outcomes, CRRA SWF
Indi®erence Tax Lowest Consumption
index rate consumption ratio
½ ¿½[4] c1 c5=c1
1 0.000 0.200 13.0
{1 0.236 0.250 7.2
{3 0.286 0.249 6.6
{5 0.303 0.248 6.4
{7 0.311 0.247 6.4
::: :::
1 0.407 0.308 3.8
Remark. ¹ = 4, CRRA social welfare function.
At this point we want to obtain an estimation of the welfare loss due to using tax
morale coe±cient ^ ¹ rather than the true one, without assuming w1 = 0 (as was done
in Theorem 3). Table 7 displays the results for ¿0:4 for ¹ = 4 and ^ ¹ = 6. The end
result is disappointing: e±ciency drops only about 2%. The details are much more
interesting. The rise of tax rate from 0.287 to 0.362 reduces the labor supply from 0.713
to 0.638. On the one hand, it decreases labor disutility, i.e. increases the utility; on the
other hand, it reduces the output, and diminishes or even eliminates the impact of the
redistribution. Though the transfer to the poorest quintile rises from 0.106 to 0.112;
their consumption drops from 0.249 to 0.240.
Table 7. The individual suboptimal outcomes for 2-quintile optimum
Wage Undeclared Transfer





0.2 0.050 {0.112 0.240
0.4 0.100 {0.084 0.340
0.7 0.175 {0.042 0.489
1.1 0.275 0.014 0.688
2.6 0.650 0.225 1.435
Remarks. º = 0:4, ¹ = 4, ¿0:4[10] = 0:362, L¤ = 0:638.
Finally, to explain the anomaly found by Alesina and Angelitos (2005) in our frame-
work, we display two countries with two welfare shares: ºL = 0:2 (low) and ºH = 0:6
(high) and two pre-tax wage rate inequality setups. For the sake of simplicity, we keep
the original wage rates of Table 2 for the high-inequality set up, and create a low-
inequality set up by scaling down the deviations from the mean: wi(!) = 1+!(wi ¡1)
with ! = 0:8. Since the (dis)utility parameters are uniform, the pre- and post-tax indi-
cators are the same.) Comparing the economies represented by rows 2 and 3 of Table
118, lower welfare share 0.2 (vs. 0.6) overrules the impact of lower earning inequality and
leads to a higher optimal tax rate 0.265 (vs. 0.237). Note that smaller di®erences in
welfare shares may not overrule the impact of higher wage rate inequality. For example,
if the higher inequality country reduces º = 0:6 to 0.4, then its optimal tax rate would
rise to 0.287 (cf. Table 2), surpassing the other country's 0.2-optimum.








Remark. ¹ = 4.
We could continue the numerical exploration without any di±culty but for our pur-
poses, this seems to be su±cient to show the basic idea of the model: in addition to the
much studied elasticity of labor supply and welfare share (or the indi®erence index),
tax morale also plays an important role in the design of optimal income taxation. This
observation is also supported by my previous paper (Simonovits, 2010), where a dis-
tinctly di®erent speci¯cation of the problem (with logarithmic utility functions, ¯xed
labor supply and purely utilitarian social welfare function) gave qualitatively similar
results.
4. Conclusions
In this very simple toy model with linear{quadratic utilities, we were able to study the
impact of the exogenous tax morale on the socially optimal tax rate. Under certain
assumptions (uniform linear-quadratic utilities, truncated (or exclusive) social welfare
function), we proved analytically Theorems 1 and 2: higher morale and lower welfare
share imply higher socially optimal tax rate. We can add a third observation: higher
earning inequality implies a higher optimal tax rate, but this can be reversed by a higher
welfare share. Incidentally, political economy considerations implied similar results: a
higher tax morale implies a higher equilibrium tax rate. Further work should be done
to check the robustness of our results, i.e. extend Theorems 1 and 2 to other utility
functions, social welfare functions and heterogeneous tax morales. More importantly,
the exogenous tax morales and simple labor disutility functions should be replaced
by endogenous tax morales and sophisticated labor disutilities implying realistic labor
supplies. Provision of public goods and its e±ciency also require attention.
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